W. J. Lund, Willard E. Knibbee et al v. Cottonwood Meadows Company et al : Brief of Appellant by Utah Supreme Court
Brigham Young University Law School
BYU Law Digital Commons
Utah Supreme Court Briefs (pre-1965)
1964
W. J. Lund, Willard E. Knibbee et al v. Cottonwood
Meadows Company et al : Brief of Appellant
Utah Supreme Court
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1
Part of the Law Commons
Original Brief submitted to the Utah Supreme Court; funding for digitization provided by the
Institute of Museum and Library Services through the Library Services and Technology Act,
administered by the Utah State Library, and sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library; machine-
generated OCR, may contain errors.
Mulliner, Prince & Mangum; Attorneys for Respondent;
Ollie McCulloch; Attorney for Respondents;
Harold N. Wilkinson; Homer F. Wilkinson; George H. Searle; Attorneys for Appellant;
This Brief of Appellant is brought to you for free and open access by BYU Law Digital Commons. It has been accepted for inclusion in Utah Supreme
Court Briefs (pre-1965) by an authorized administrator of BYU Law Digital Commons. For more information, please contact
hunterlawlibrary@byu.edu.
Recommended Citation
Brief of Appellant, Lund v. Cottonwood Meadows Co., No. 10015 (Utah Supreme Court, 1964).
https://digitalcommons.law.byu.edu/uofu_sc1/4432
-· ·-· • • vr u IAH 
APR 1ft~ 
IN THE SUPREME GQJ.LK 1 
OF THE _ . !RARy 
STATE OF \ITt¥_ ~c;.D 
I ! () 0 '::JI..•'"'· V. J. LUND, et al., j~N '"' · 
Plaintiffs and Appellants _ _ ________ _ c~~-~::··c~-~-~-;--
- Su?;urllC 
-vs.- '-·c·ase No. 10015 
COITONWOOD MEADOWS 
COMPANY, et al., 
Defendants and Respondents 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from a Summary Judgment Rendered Against 
the Appellants by the Honorable Stewart M. Hanson, 
Judge of the Third District Court in and for 
Salt Lake County, State of ,Utah 
HAROLD N. WILKINSON 
HOMER F. WILKINSON 
10 Executive Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
GEORGE H. SEARLE 
2805 South State Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorneys for Appellant 
MULLINER, PRINCE AND MANGUM 
315 East Second South 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
-~Uomeys for the Respondent 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
Page 
ST.\TE:\lE:'\T OF NATURE OF CASE ..................................... . 
IHSPOSITI< ):"\ IN LOWER COURT··················--·---····-------------- 2 
RELIEF SOC< ~HT ON APPEAL---------------··········------------------------- 2 
STATE:\lE:'-IT OF ~lATERIAL FACTS-------------------------------------- 2 
AR< ~ l 1 :\I ENT ------------------------------------------------------------------------------------ 5 
POINT I. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING 
THAT THE APPELLANTS FAILED TO 
EXHAUST THEIR ADMINISTRATIVE 
REMEDY-------------------------------------------·····-·····-·····-· 5 
POINT II. THE BUILDING PERMIT ISSUED TO 
THE RESPONDENTS IN VIOLATION OF 
THE EXISTING ZONING ORDINANCE IS 
NULL AND VOID AND THE RESPOND-
ENTS DID NOT ACQUIRE ANY VESTED 
RIGHTS EVEN THOUGH THEY MAY 
HAVE ACTED IN RELIANCE ON SAID 
PERMIT -------------------------------------------------------------- 9 
POINT III. THE RESPONDENTS DID NOT OBTAIN 
ANY VESTED RIGHTS UPON THE FIL-
ING OF AN APPLICATION FOR A BUILD-
ING PERMIT FOR WHEN THE ORDI-
NANCE WAS AMENDED THE AMEND-
MENT BECAME CONTROLLING AND 
RIGHTS COULD NOT VEST------------------------ 12 
POI~T IV. THAT IF THE RESPONDENTS ARE EN-
TITLED TO A BUILDING PERMIT, THE 
SA:\IE SHOULD BE RESTRICTED TO AND 
PROVIDE THAT THE MINIMUM LOT 
AREA FOR EACH AND EVERY DWELL-
ING STRUCTURE SHOULD BE ONE (1) 
ACRE. -----·------------·······-----------------------------------······-- 16 
CONCLl"SION -------------·····----------·-·······----·······-·-·-·-·-···---·-····---------·· 18 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS- Continued 
AUTHORITIES AND TEXTS CITED 
Page 
75 A.L.R.2d 236 ................................................................................ 12 
40 A.L.R. 732 .................................................................................... 16 
169 A.L.R. 584 ····················································--···-····-··--·····-·-····--· 12 
42 Am. Jur., Public Administrative Sec. 199, Pg. 583 ...................... 7 
42 Am. Jur., Public Administrative Law, Sec. 200,585 --------····-····· 6 
58 Am. Jur. Zoning, Sec. 182 ............................................................ 12 
58 Am. Jur. Zoning, Sec. 184 ·-----·-··--··---···------------------···--·-·············-· 10 
58 Am. Jur. Zoning, Sec. 185 -------·-----------·-··------····--------·····--··-········· 15 
20 C.J.S. County, Sec. 95 -----··-··-·······---------------------·-······-·-················ 9 
101 C.J.S. Zoning, Sees. 90 and 221 .................................................. 12 
101 C.J.S. Zoning, Sec. 238, Pg. 1001 ................................................ 10 
Re Dengles, 160 N.Y.S.2d 83 ............................................................ 13 
CASES CITED 
Board of County Commissioners v. Snyder, 46 A.2d 689 ................ 12 
Board of Zoning Adjustments v. Boykin, 92 So. 2d 906 .................. 11 
Case v. City of Los Angeles, 298 P.2d 50 .......................................... 12 
Clark v. Warner, 204 P. 929 -·····················-····-···--~---··························· 8 
Conlon v. Board of Public Works, 94 A. 20 660 ................................ 7 
Coyle v. Erie R. Co., 59 A.2d 817 ...................................................... 7 
Geneva Investment Company v. City of St. Louis, Missouri, 
87 F.2d 83 .................................................................................... 16 
Harrison Ridge Associates Corporation v. Sforza, 
179 N.Y.S.2d 547 .......................................................................... 13 
McCarty v. Schuette, 24 N.W.2d 244 .............................................. 11 
McMasters v. Owen, 81 N.Y.S.2d 564 ............................................ 7 
Miami Shore Village v. Wm. N. Brockway, Post, 24 So. 2d 33 ...... 11 
Miller v. Board of Public Works, 234 P. 381 .................................. 16 
Provo City v. Claudin, 63 P.2d 570 .................................................. 7 
Re Town Board v. Huntington, 214 N.Y.S.2d 164 .......................... 13 
Rodu v. Lee, 81 A.2d 517 .................................................................. 13 
Security First National Bank v. Los Angeles County, 
217 P.2d 946 ................................................................................ 7 
State v. City of Bellvue, 275 P.2d 899 .............................................. 14 
Taylor v. City of Hackinsack, 5 A.2d 788 ........................................ 12 
Underhill v. Board of Appeals, 72 N.Y.S.2d 588 ............................ 10 
V. F. Yahodiakin Engineering Corporation v. Zoning 
Board of Adjustments, 86 A.2d 127 ............................................ 11 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
TABLE OF CONTENTS- Continued 
Page 
STATUTES CITED 
Uniform Zoning Ordinances of Salt Lake County, Utah, 1953: 
8-1-3, Pg. 2 .................................................................................. 3 
8-1-6(28),Pg.5 ........................................................................ 3 
8-1-6 ( 64) , Pg. 9 . . . . . . . .. . . .. . . .. .. .. . . . . . . .. . . .. . . .. . . .. . . .. .. ... ... .. .. .. ....... ...... 3 
8-1-6 (68), Pg. 9 ........................................................................ 3 
8-1-7, Pg. 10 ................................................................................ 3 
8-1-10, Pg. 10 .............................................................................. 11 
8-12-1, Pg. 31 .............................................................................. 4 
8-12-2, Pg. 31 .............................................................................. 4 
8-26-2, Pg. 48 .............................................................................. 3 
Utah Code Annotated, 1953: 
17-27-12 ...................................................................................... 9 
17-27-16 ................................................................................ 5, 7, 8 
17-27-23 .................................................................................... 8, 9 
17-27-28 ...................................................................................... 7 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
I~ THE SUPREME COURT 
OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
\'. J. LUND, et al., 
Plaintiffs and Appellants 
-vs.-
COTTONWOOD MEADOWS 
CO:\lPANY, et al., 
Defendants and Respondents 
Case No. 10015 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
ST.\TEl\1ENT OF NATURE OF CASE 
This is an action to permanently enjoin and restrain the 
respondents from building a Mobile Trailer Park in the 
area known as Cottonwood Heights, which is within the 
jurisdiction and under the authority of the "Uniform Zon-
ing Ordinance of Salt Lake County, Utah," also known as 
Title 8, Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake County, Utah, 
1953, and as amended effective June 15, 1957 (Defendant, 
Exhibit # 3), and further amended on or about April 25, 
1962 ( R. 3 7 last sentence of paragraph 7) ; to order the re-
call and voiding of building permit heretofore issued to the 
respondents allowing them to build and establish a Mobile 
Trailer Park in said area; in the alternative that in the 
event respondents are entitled to receive a building permit 
as applied for, that the same be restricted to and provide 
that the minimum lot area for each and every dwelling 
structure shall be one ( 1 ) acre. 
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DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
Summary Judgment was granted in favor of respond-
ents allowing respondents to establish 205 trailer dwelling 
structures on a less than 26-acre plot of land ( R. 48, R. 49, 
R. 57, and R. 58). 
The court's ruling was primarily based upon the finding 
that the decision of the County Planning Board permitting 
and allowing the respondents to proceed was not appealed 
within 90 days to the Salt Lake County Board of Adjust-
ment and the appellants slept on their rights and are not in 
a position to resort to the courts for the purpose of pro-
hibiting respondents' building program. 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
Reversal of Summary Judgment granted to respondents 
and an order directing the Third District Court in and for 
Salt Lake County, Utah, to permanently enjoin and re-
strain the respondents from building a Mobile Trailer Park, 
or to order the recall and voiding of the building permit 
heretofore issued to the respondents allowing them to build 
and establish 205 trailer dwelling structures on a less than 
26-acre plot of land, or in the event it is found that respond-
ents are entitled to receive a building permit, that the same 
be restricted to and provide that the minimum lot area for 
each and every dwelling structure shall be one ( 1 ) acre. 
STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS 
The "Uniform Zoning Ordinances of Salt Lake County, 
Utah" a/k/a Title 8, Revised Ordinances of Salt Lake 
County, Utah 1953 as amended, effective June 15, 1957 
(Respondents' Exhibit # 3) provides: 
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8-1-3 at page 2 
"In interprt'lin~ and applying the provisions of this ordinance, 
the requirements contained herein are declared to be the mini-
mum requirements for the purposes set forth." 
8-1-6 (28) at page 5 
"Dwelling, Any building, or portion thereof, which is designed 
for use for residential purposes, except***." 
8-1-6 (64) at page 9 
"Structure, Anything constructed or erected, which requires 
location on the ground or attached to something having a location 
on the ground." 
8-1-6 (68) at page 9 
"Trailer Camp, Any area or tract of land used or designated to 
accommodate two (2) or more automobile trailers or camping 
parties." 
8-1-7 at page 10 
"Building Permit Required. The use of land or the construction, 
alteration, repair, or removal of any building or structure or any 
part thereof, as provided or as restricted in this Ordinance shall 
not be commenced, or proceeded with, except after the issuance of 
a written permit for the same by the County Building Inspector." 
AGRICULTURAL ZONE A-2 
8-26-1 at page 48 
"Use Regulations. In Agricultural Zone A-2, no building, 
structure or land shall be erected which is arranged, intended or 
designed to be used for other than one or more of the following 
uses: 
(7) Trailer Camps." 
8-26-2 at page 48 
"Area Regulations. None, except that the minimum lot area 
for any dwelling structure shall be one ( 1) acre." 
Trailer camps are authorized in the following zoned 
areas; A-2, A-3, C-3, M-1 and M-2 (Respondents' Exhibit 
=3 at Page 12). In areas A-2 and A-3 trailer camps are 
restricted to a minimum lot area for any dwelling to one 
(1) acre. In areas C-3, M-1 and M-2 no such restriction 
is imposed. 
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Salt Lake County on or about April 25, 1962 amended 
its zoning ordinances changing the classification of the area 
here involved from Agricultural Zone A-2 to Residential 
Zone S-1A, which amendment became effective on May 10, 
1962 (R. 37). 
RESIDENTIAL ZONE S-1A 
8-12-1 at page 31 
"In Residential Zone S-1A, no building, structure or land shall 
be erected which is arranged, intended, or designated to be used 
for other than one or more of the following uses:" 
(MOBILE TRAILER PARKS NOT INCLUDED 
OR LISTED) 
8-12-2 at page 31 
"Area Regulations. The minimum lot area shall not be less 
than ( 1) Acre." 
The following appears to be the chronological order of 
happening of events in this matter: T. 100-106 
January 30, 
1962 
February 8, 
1962 
March 28, 
1962 
April10, 
1962 
April18, 
1962 
April25, 
1962 
April25, 
1962 
Application was made by some of the appellants to 
amend the Zoning from Agricultural A-2 to Resi-
dential S-1A which would in effect outlaw Mobile 
Trailer Camps. 
The contract for the purchase of the property was 
executed by the respondent. 
Plans for a Mobile Trailer Park were submitted to 
the Planning Commission by the respondents. 
Altered plans for a Mobile Trailer Park were sub-
mitted to the Planning Commission by the re-
spondents. 
Subdivision Committee of the Planning Commis-
sion approved respondents' plans on the conditions 
that certain alterations be made. 
A public hearing was held on appellants' applica-
tion to amend the Zoning Ordinance from Agricul-
tural A-2 to Residential S-1A. 
The Salt Lake County Commission approved the 
appellants' application to rezone the area to S-1A. 
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1962 
June 8, 
1962 
June 12, 
1962 
July 19 
1962 
5 
The zoning amendment rezoning the area from 
Agricultural A-2 to Residential S-1A became effec-
tive. 
Salt Lake County Attorney's Office directed that 
the planning commission should sign and approve 
the respondents' applications and the building and 
zoning inspection department should issue a build-
ing permit to the respondents. (Respondents' Ex-
hibit #4) 
Respondents' plans were signed by the Planning 
Commission and the same were back dated to April 
10, 1962 as being the approval date thereof. 
Respondents' plans were approved by the Board of 
Health. 
August 21, Respondents' plans were approved by the County 
1962 Surveyor. 
September 10, Building permit was issued to Respondents. 
1962 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE AP-
PELLANTS FAILED TO EXHAUST THEIR ADMINISTRA-
TIVE RE:MEDY. 
The trial court erred in ruling against the appellants and 
granting summary judgment for the respondents ( Mem-
orandum Decision R. 48) and again on appellants' motion 
to set aside the summary judgment (Memorandum Deci-
sion R. 57) upon the grounds that the appellants failed to 
exhaust their administrative remedies by not appealing the 
decision of the County Planning Commission to the County 
Board of Adjustment within 90 days. This is based on Sec. 
17-27-16 UCA 1953 which provides in part: 
''Appeals to the board of adjustment may be taken by any 
person aggrieved by his inability to obtain a building permit, or 
by the decision of any administrative officer or agency based upon 
or made in the course of the administration or enforcement of 
the provisions of the zoning resolution. Appeals to the board of 
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adjustment may be taken by any officer, department, board or 
bureau of the county affected by the grant or refusal of a building 
permit or by other decision of an administrative officer or agency 
based on or made in the course of the administration or enforce-
ment of the provisions of the zoning resolution. The time within 
which such appeal must be made, and the form or other pro-
cedure relating thereto, shall be as specified in the general rules 
provided in writing by the board of county commissioners to 
govern the procedure of such board of adjustment or in the sup-
plemental rules of procedure adopted by such board provided 
further, that said rules and regulations shall be available to the 
public at the office of the county commissioners at all time .... " 
(Emphasis added) 
The County Commissioners in response to this section, 
have adopted the following rule of procedure: 
"An appeal to the Board of Adjustment must be taken within 
ninety ( 90) days after the cause arises or the appeal will not be 
considered by the Board of Adjustment." 
The appellants have no argument with the general rule 
of exhaustion of administrative remedies, but assert that it 
is a rule with many limitations and exceptions and is not 
applicable in this case for many reasons. First, the cases 
indicate that when it would appear that the administrative 
remedy would be fruitless because the administrative body 
would be powerless to afford relief, then the appeal would 
be unnecessary. 42 Am. Jur. Public Administrative Law, 
Sec. 200, Pg. 585. The Board of Adjustment can grant ad-
justments or variances under the ordinance, but appellants 
assert that under the law, the Board does not have the 
power to say that an ordinance is arbitrary or unreasonable 
or that an ordinance is invalid or that a building permit 
granted under an ordinance that has been amended would 
be invalid for, in effect, the Board would be ruling on the 
validity of the new ordinance. This is what the Board of 
Adjustment would have to do in this case for the building 
permit was issued in violation of the new ordinance. This 
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raises the legal question as to whether the old ordinance or 
the amended ordinance is applicable and this can only be 
decided by a judicial tribunal. Provo City vs. Claudin, 
63 P.2d 570, Conlan v. Board of Public Works, 94 A. 20, 
660. 
The doctrine applies where the express terms of the stat-
ute makes the exhaustion of the administrative remedy a 
condition precedent to the right to bring a court action. 
However, the doctrine does not apply where the terms of 
the statute either expressly or by implication makes the 
bringing of the administrative remedy permissible only, 
which would indicate that the legislature intended to allow 
a judicial remedy even though the administrative remedy 
had not been exhausted. This would mean that the parties 
would be given an election of remedies either administra-
tive or judicial. 42 Am. J ur. Public Administrative Law, 
Sec. 199, Pg. 583. Security First National Bank v. Los An-
geles County, 217 P.2d 946, Coyle v. Erie R. Co., 59 A.2d 
817, McMasters v. Owen, 81 N.Y.S.2d 564. 
I refer the court to Sec. 17-27-16 which is quoted on 
page 5 of this brief, especially to the italicized portions 
which provide "appeals to the board of adjustments may be 
taken'' and again further down "appeals to the board of 
adjustments may be taken." This does not say "shall" or 
"must'' be taken, but "may" which is permissive and not 
mandatory language in statutory construction. 
The legislature realized and intended this for they pro-
vided another remedy under Sec. 17-27-28 which states: 
"It shall be unlawful to erect, construct, reconstruct, alter, 
maintain or use any building or structure or to use any land in 
vi~lation of any regulation in, or any provision of, any zoning reso-
lutwn, or any amendment thereof, enacted or adopted by any 
board of county commissioners under the authority of the act. 
Any person, firm or corporation violating any regulation in, or of 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
8 
any provision of, any zoning resolution, or any amendment of this 
act, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. In case any building or 
structure is or is proposed to be erected, constructed, reconstructed, 
altered, maintained or used, or any land is or is proposed to be 
used, in violation of this act or of any regulation or provision of 
any resolution, or amendment thereof, enacted or adopted by any 
board of county commissioners under the authority granted by this 
act, such board, the district attorney of the county or any owner 
of real estate within the district in which such building~ structure 
or land is situated~ may~ in addition to other remedies provided by 
law~ institute injunction~ mandamus~ abatement or any other ap-
propriate action or actions~ proceeding or proceedings to prevent, 
enjoin~ abate or remove such unlawful erection~ construction~ re-
construction~ alteration~ maintenance or use." (Emphasis added) 
You will note that this gives a judicial action in addition 
to "other remedy provided by law" or the permissive ap-
peal to the Board of Adjustment. The case at hand is clearly 
a case where the appellants had an election of remedies, 
and they chose to resort to the courts. Even if the court finds 
that the appellants should have appealed to the Board of 
Adjustment, the appellants are now barred by the 90-day 
limitation laid down by the Board of County Commissioners 
so the appellants' administrative remedy has now been ex-
hausted, and they would have the right to bring an original 
action as provided for in Sec. 17-27-23. 
Appellants also contend that they have a right to bring 
an appeal for the Board would not have jurisdiction to hear 
the matter since the appellants are not "persons aggrieved" 
as required in Sec. 17-27-16. 
The Supreme Court of Oklahoma in the case of Clark v. 
Warner, 204 P. 929, had the question come before them as 
to what "person aggrieved" meant. The court held: 
"Webster's International Dictionary defined 'aggrieved' as follows: 
'Adversely affected in respect of legal rights; suffering from an 
infringement or denial of legal rights.' 
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Bouvier's Law Dictionary defined "aggrieved" as follows: 
'Having a grievance, or suffered loss or injury. The parties 
aggrieved are those against whom an appealable order or judg-
ment has been entered. One cannot be said to be aggrieved 
unless error has been committed against him.' 
A person cannot be said to be aggrieved when they are only re-
motely or indirectly affected by the decision or action of the board 
of county commissioners. In a civil action the persons who may be 
aggrieved by the decision of the court are the parties to the action, 
the real parties in interest. The one aggrieved is the one against 
whom a judgment or decision is rendered or order made ... " 
See also, 20 C.J.S., County, Sec. 95. 
In this case the appellants are not aggrieved by any ac-
tion of the Board, for action was not taken directly against 
them. They are not appealing from any decision for they 
have not been parties to any action, but are instituting an 
action in the first instance as owners of real estate under Sec. 
17-27-23. 
POINT II 
THE BUILDING PERMIT ISSUED TO THE RESPONDENTS 
I~ VIOLATION OF THE EXISTING ZONING ORDINANCE 
IS NULL AND VOID AND THE RESPONDENTS DID NOT 
ACQUIRE ANY VESTED RIGHTS EVEN THOUGH THEY 
~1.\ Y HAVE ACTED IN RELIANCE ON SAID PERMIT. 
Appellants call the Court's attention to the fact that the 
plans were actually signed by the Planning Commission, 
approved by the Board of Health, approved by the County 
Surveyor, and the Building Permit was issued after the ordi-
nance \\"as amended, all this being done in violation of the 
then existing zoning ordinance. The Utah Code Annotated 
1963, Sec. 17-27-12 provides in part: 
·• ... such building inspector s~1all not issue any permit unless the 
plans of and for the proposed erection, construction, reconstruc-
tion, alteration~ or use fully conform to all zoning regulations then 
in effect." 
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This section specifically provides that a building permit 
shall not be issued unless the plans conform to the ordinance 
then in effect, and in this case the new ordinance had gone 
into effect so the plans did not conform and the permit 
should not have been issued. A permit issued in violation 
of law is null and void and confers no vested rights on the 
holder even though the holder acts in reliance on the per-
mit. 101 C.J.S. Zoning, Sec. 238 Pg. 1001 provides: 
"Generally, an unauthorized permit or certificate, or one which 
violates, or does not comply with, the zoning laws or ordinances is 
void, or a nullity, and confers no rights on the permittee ... and 
does not bind the municipality in any respect, even though the 
permittee may have commenced building operation, or otherwise 
incurred expenses or obligation thereunder .... An unauthorized 
permit does not constitute a basis for estoppel, or prejudice or 
destroy the rights of the public to require the enforcement of zon-
ing laws valid on their face." 
See also 58 Am. Jur. Zoning, Sec. 184. 
In the case of Underhill v. Board of Appeals, 72 N.Y.S.2d 
588, action was brought by a group of property owners 
against the Board of Appeals for granting a building permit 
for the building of an airport, one of the bases of the action 
being that the permit was issued in violation of the zoning 
ordinance. The permittee went to a great deal of expense 
in constructing an aviation field, hangars, office building, 
gasoline pumps, etc. The court in ruling for the petitioners 
quoted from Judge Cardoza to the effect that when the 
permit was revoked by the court, it returned the parties to 
the position they were before the issuance of the permit, 
that the establishment of the airport and structure were 
illegal and the permittees did not acquire any vested rights 
to maintain their structures or continue operation even 
though they acted under the permit. In effect, it was as if a 
permit had never been granted. The Supreme Court of 
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Alabama in the case of Board of Zoning Adjustments v. 
Boykin, 92 So.2d 906 held: 
"When a building permit is issued in violation of the zoning ordi-
nann· it is invalid, and the permittee acquires no vested rights 
thereunder and this although the permittee has incurred expense 
in connection therewith and in reliance thereon. (citation omitted) 
And one to whom a building permit has been illegally issued can-
not successfully invoke the doctrine of estoppel so as to preclude 
the municipality from revoking the permit, notwithstanding the 
fact that the permittee may have acted in good faith and may have 
expended money or incurred obligation in reliance upon the per-
mit. (citationsomitted)" 
I refer the court to the case of McCarty v. Schuette, 
24 N.W.2d 244 where the plaintiff who was an adjoining 
property owner to the defendant brought action against 
him for building a garage in violation of the zoning ordi-
nance even though the defendant was acting under a build-
ing permit. The court held that the permit offered no pro-
tection because the garage was in violation of the ordinance 
and it was proper for plaintiff to maintain this action. The 
Florida court in the case of Miami Shore Village v. Wm. N. 
Brockway, Post., 24 So.2d 33 held that a permit issued in 
violation of law confers no right because every person is 
presumed to know the nature and extent of the powers of 
the municipal office. This was after the permittee had gone 
to a great deal of expense of obtaining plans, excavating, 
purchasing material and pouring a foundation. A permit 
issued in violation of an existing zoning ordinance was held 
to be null and void and the governmental powers may not 
be forfeited by the action of the local office in disregard of 
the ordinance in the case of V. F. Yahodiakin Engineering 
Corporation v. Zoning Board of Adjustments, 86 A.2d 127. 
The Uniform Zoning Ordinance of Salt Lake County, 
Sec. 8-1-1 0 provides : 
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"Licensing. All departments, officials and public employees of Salt 
Lake County which are vested with the duty of authority to issue 
permits or licenses shall conform to the provisions of this Title and 
shall issue no permit or license for use, building or purpose where 
the same would be in conflict with the provisions of this Title, and 
any such permit or license, if issued in conflict with the provisions 
of this Title shall be null and void." 
The Court should find that the respondents' permit 
issued after the ordinance was amended is null and void 
and was never a valid permit. 
POINT III 
THE RESPONDENTS DID NOT OBTAIN ANY VESTED 
RIGHTS UPON THE FILING OF AN APPLICATION FOR A 
BUILDING PERMIT FOR WHEN THE ORDINANCE WAS 
AMENDED THE AMENDMENT BECAME CONTROLLING 
AND RIGHTS COULD NOT VEST. 
The cases hold that zoning regulations are not regarded 
as contracts made by the municipality with the land owner 
and may be modified at any time. Also, that property 
owners do not obtain a vested right as a result of a zon-
ing ordinance which would preclude a future amendment 
to the ordinance and that the governmental body is not 
estopped from enforcing any change in the ordinance. Case 
v. City of Los Angeles, 298 P.2d 50, Taylor v. City of Hack-
insack, 5 A.2d 788. 
The great majority of the cases hold that if an ordinance 
is amended while an application for a permit is pending 
that the application will be controlling. 169 A.L.R. 584, 
75 A.L.R.2d 236, 101 C.J.S. Zoning, Sees. 90 and 221, 58 
Am. Jur. Zoning, Sec. 182. In the Maryland case of the 
Board of County Commissioners v. Snyder, 46 A.2d 689, 
the Defendant on September 7th purchased property, had 
plans prepared by an architect, and spent several thousands 
of dollars in grading and preparing the land to build a busi-
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nrss building which was in compliance with the then exist-
ing ordinance. On October 7th and again on November 
17th, Defendant made application for a building permit. 
Certain residents became aware of the situation and pro-
tested the issuance of the permit. The permit was denied 
on December 5th pursuant to an amendment of the zon-
ing ordinance on November 28th. The court in holding 
that the city had the right to amend the zoning ordinance 
even after the application had been filed stated: 
"But it does not follow that the proposed business in the case at bar 
was established or existing. No permit was issued, and if it had 
been, it would have conferred no vested rights, nor would it have 
created any estoppel. (citations omitted) A mere intention to use 
of the business in the particular zone .... " 
In the case of Re Town Board v. Huntington, 214 
N.Y.S.2d 164, an application was made to extend the busi-
ness use of certain property as was then permitted by the 
zoning ordinance and upon the granting of the application 
the town appealed and during the time of the appeal 
amended the ordinance prohibiting the extending business 
use. The court held: 
"The right to an extension did not vest, and this appeal must be 
decided upon the law as it now exists." 
See also Re Dengles, 160 N.Y.S.2d 83, Harrison Ridge 
Associates Corporation v. Sforza, 179 N.Y.S.2d 547. 
Also, the court, in the case of Rodu v. Lee, 81 A.2d 517, 
held that the law in effect at the time of the decision of the 
court is controlling for the court stated: 
"The first question is whether or not the zoning ordinance, as it 
existed ... when the applications for the permits were filed, or 
whether the zoning ordinance as subsequently amended, is con-
trolling. The law as it exists at the time of the decision in the 
instant proceeding is controlling. Concord apartments vs. Board 
of Adjustments, 1 N. J. Super. 301, 64 A. 2d 355. (App. Div. 
1949) ." 
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I call the Court's attention to the chronology of events 
which are listed under the facts, particularly to the fact that 
an application for the change of zoning was filed on January 
30, 1962 and the application for a building permit was not 
filed until March 28, 1962. If the rights vest in either party 
they would vest first in those who were first to file an appli-
cation for the zoning amendment. They had the right to 
have their application acted on and decided before action 
was taken on respondents' subsequent application. 
However, as in most fields of the law, there are limita-
tions to the general rule, those being if before the ordinance 
is amended a party substantially changes his position in 
reliance on the ordinance, or if only ministerial acts are left 
to be performed before a permit is issued. The respondents 
were negotiating on the property in January but did not 
execute the contract for the purchase of the property until 
February 8, 1962 which was during the time the change of 
zoning application was pending. A public hearing on the 
zoning application was held on April25, 1962 and the ordi-
nance was amended on May 10, 1962. Four months after 
this on September 10, 1962, the building permit was issued. 
The respondents surely had knowledge of the happenings 
of these events and cannot now be heard to say that they 
changed their position in reliance on the former ordinance. 
Any expenses they incurred was at their own risk. 
Respondents in their argument before the court (T.125) 
refers to the ministerial limitation and cite the case of State 
v. City of Bellvue, 275 P.2d 899 as authority. In the Bellvue 
case the City refused to grant a permit for business because 
the applicant failed to provide off-street parking. The ap-
plicant cured this defect and the city still refused on the 
grounds that the off-street parking did not represent the 
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highest and best use to which the property could be put. 
The applicant sought a writ of mandate compelling the issu-
ance of the permit and the city responded by then attempt-
ing to rezone the area. On appeal, the court held for the 
applicant. There may have been only a ministerial act left 
to be performed in the Bellvue case, but in the case at hand, 
there was an application to amend the ordinance staring the 
Board in the face, which they must rule on prior to issuing 
a building permit, and approval still had to be obtained 
from the County Surveyor and Board of Health, so you can 
hardly say that there was only a ministerial act left to be 
performed. The Bellvue case is certainly distinguishable on 
its facts and is not in point with the case before this court, 
which case falls within the rule followed by the overwhelm-
ing majority of the cases. 
If we look at this in the light most favorable to there-
spondents and assume that the approval of the plans and 
the issuance of the building permit were valid, then the 
question arises as to what effect the zoning amendment has 
on the permit and what rights, if any, an applicant acquires 
if he obtains approval and then the ordinance is amended. 
The general rule is set forth in 58 Am. Jur. Zoning, Sec. 185, 
which provides: 
''A number of cases sustain the express or implied revocation of a 
building permit where, subsequent to its issuance, the city passes 
a valid ordinance which has the effect of prohibiting the erection 
of a building such as the one in question, and, under some deci-
sions, this is true even though the grantee of the permit has entered 
. into contracts, bought material, or incurred other expenses. This 
rule has been applied in the case of a subsequent zoning ordinance 
or amendment thereof, and it is held that the grant of a permit or 
license does not preclude the application thereto of a new zoning 
regulation prohibiting the erection of the building or the operation 
of the business in the particular zone .... " 
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Cases support the general rule to the effect that munici-
palities through their police power may impliedly revoke an 
existing building permit by amending the existing ordi-
nance, for the California Court in the case of Miller v. 
Board of Public Works, 234 P. 381, held: 
"No point is made that the Board has not the power to revoke a 
permit once it has been duly issued, nor that the ordinance if 
valid, may not operate retroactively to nullify a permit previo~sly 
issued." 
Seealso40A.L.R. 732. 
In the case of Geneva Investment Company v. City of 
St. Louis, Missouri, 87 F.2d 83, where the applicant, on 
November 18, obtained a permit to construct a filling sta-
tion and on December 6th, the ordinance was amended, 
the court held : 
"The building permits created no vested right, but were subject to 
revocation by the proper exercise of police power. The amend-
ing ordinance had the effect of revoking the permits. (citations 
omitted) ... The loss sustained by appellant through depreciation 
of value, if the ordinance is sustained, while proper for considera-
tion by the court, is not controlling, for if the police power is prop-
erly exercised, loss to the individual is a misfortune which he must 
undergo as a member of society." 
POINT IV 
THAT IF THE RESPONDENTS ARE ENTITLED TO A 
BUILDING PERMIT, THE SAME SHOULD BE RESTRICTED 
TO AND PROVIDE THAT THE MINIMUJ\tf LOT AREA FOR 
EACH AND EVERY DWELLING STRUCTURE SHOULD BE 
ONE ( 1) ACRE. 
The lower court chose to ignore the fact that on January 
30, 1962 application was made by some of the citizens of the 
area to rezone the area from Agricultural A-2 to Residen-
tial S-1A which by deleting "trailer camps" did "outlaw" 
the same prior to any application made by the respondents. 
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The lower court chose to ignore the fact that the re-
spondents who had made application for a permit and were 
parties to the proceedings slept on their rights by not ap-
pealing, within ninety (90) days as required by the rule of 
procedure of the Board of County Commissioners, there-
zoning to S-1A which became effective and law on May 10, 
1962, prior to the respondents being granted a building 
permit. 
The lower court chose to ignore the fact that the area 
now supports a $125,000.00 Country Club, numerous 
above-average residential homes built in platted subdivi-
sions serviced with sewer, gas and electricity all being in-
stalled primarily for residential purposes and hardly for 
agricultural endeavors. 
The lower court chose to ignore that "trailer camps" in 
an agricultural area such as A-2 and A-3 would contem-
plate the same being sheepherder camps or cattle camps 
and not Mobile Trailer Park or tourist camps which would 
be permissible in areas such as C-3, M-1, and M-2 where 
they would not be limited to one ( 1 ) acre lots. 
The lower court chose to ignore the great and important 
investment that the residential home owners, as represented 
by the appellants, have invested in their homes and the 
area; the school and church problems that would arise and 
the tax impact imposed upon such an agricultural area 
under Zoning A-2 or the residential area under Zoning 
S-1A. 
Instead the lower court chose to see: That it is just and 
reasonable to impose upon a property owner who would 
wish to build a home for his family without wheels attached 
to it that he be restricted for the good of the public to not 
less than a one ( 1 ) acre plot of ground for each "dwelling 
structure," while if he attaches wheels to the side of his 
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"dwelling structure" he could put as many on one ( 1) acre 
of ground as he wished. 
That the appellants had acquired no vested rights by 
the fact that some of the residents had applied for rezoning 
prior to the respondents applying for a building permit and 
the area was in fact, rezoned prior to the issuance of the 
building permit. 
That it was not necessary for the respondents to admin-
istratively appeal the rezoning to S-1A within 90 days even 
though the same became effective and law before there-
spondents were granted a building permit, but that the ap-
pellants who were not aggrieved party and some of whom 
were not even on the application for the zoning change 
slept on their rights by not appealing. 
It is submitted that if the area had not been rezoned 
from Agricultural A-2 to Residential S-1A the respondents 
would not have been entitled to place more than one ( 1) 
dwelling structure on one ( 1 ) acre of land and should not 
be allowed to place 205 trailer dwelling structures on a less 
than 26-acre plot of land as they now contemplated doing. 
The only difference is that the trailer dwelling structure 
would have some wheels attached while a substantial brick 
home would not, for both would be using the same light, 
gas, sewer, and school facilities. 
CONCLUSION 
That this court should reverse the decision of the lower 
court and find for the appellant and against the respondent. 
HAROLD N. WILKINSON 
HOMER F. WILKINSON 
GEORGE H. SEARLE 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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